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Abstract / Résumé
This paper studies the implications of non-commitment for
organizational design. An organizational form must trade-off between the
coordination benefits associated with the centralization of information and its
associated costs in terms of renegotiation. This analysis makes precise what
these benefits and costs are. First, I characterize renegotiation-proof allocations
for organizational forms that differ in the amount of decentralization that they
support. Second, I compare these different organizational forms. The analysis
shows that a complete decentralization of decision-making is always weakly
dominated by more centralized structures when information is dispersed in the
organization. Decision-making should always be in the hand of the player with
the most important or relevant information.
Cepapier étudie les implications pour la structure organisationnelle des
problèmes de non-engagement. Une structure organisationnelle adéquate permet
larbitrage entre les bénéfices et les coûts associés à la centralisation de la prise de
décision. Parmi les bénéfices, on retrouve une meilleure coordination des
informations des membres de lorganisation; parmi les coûts, on retrouve les
inefficacités reliées aux difficultés dengagement et à la renégociation. Lanalyse
démontre quune décentralisation complète est toujours faiblement dominée par une
structure plus centralisée. Finalement, la prise de décision doit être conférée aux
agents ayant linformation la plus cruciale pour la performance de lorganisation.
Mots-clés : Information asymétrique, renégociation de contrats, structure organisationnelle, décentralisation
Key Words: Asymmetric information, contract renegotiation, organizational form, decentralization
1 Introduction
It is an ongoing preoccupation of business managers to nd the optimal decision-making
structure for their rm. For example, suppose a new project comes up in a rm. The rst
important decision that must be made regarding the management of this project is how to
design the relations between the rm and the manager of this new project. One aspect of
this important decision is how much authority should be given to the project's manager as
opposed to the rm's owners or managers, namely, should decision-making for this project
be centralized to the rm's top decision-makers, or should it be decentralized to the manager
of the relevant project.
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) provide some examples in which the internal organization
of the rm has played a central role in achieving success and high protability. One striking
example is that of General Motors. The internal reorganization of General Motors under-
taken by Alfred Sloane in the early 1920s was motivated by a much needed change in its
marketing strategy which in turn had to be implemented by a modication of its decision-
making structure. Of concern was the feeling that some decisions had to be decentralized to
the dierent divisions of the company, but at the same time, some coordination of decisions
had to be maintained to ensure that the dierent divisions would not compete against each
other. This reorganization was critical to the fact that within the next twenty years General
Motors became the clear leader of the industry surpassing Ford and its highly centralized
organization. Milgrom and Roberts also give the example of the early rivalry between the
North West company and the Hudson's Bay company to capture the North American market
for animal furs. Again, in this example, organizational design was a clear determinant of the
success or failure of these rivals.
Although the problem of organizational design is central to business managers, economists
still do not understand all facets of the problem. With a complete set of contingent mar-
kets and no market imperfections, the First Theorem of Welfare states that the Walrasian
equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Organizational design then plays no role. For organizational
design to matter there must be some sort of market incompleteness. The presence of asym-
metric information is one factor of such incompleteness because there cannot exist markets
contingent on the private information detained by one or a group of agents. An organization
can then arise as a substitute to some missing markets by allowing agents to write possibly
complex contingent contracts that replicate partially (subject to private information) the
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missing markets. Private information would then be a sucient condition for the emergence
of rms.
Even if one admits that asymmetric information is a sucient condition for the existence
of organizations, economists do not know much about how such organizations should be
internally structured, namely, should decision making be centralized or decentralized. In fact,
the Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1979) states that any allocation attained by a complex
decentralized organization can always be replicated by a simple centralized organization
in which all agents report (truthfully) their private information to some central authority
which then recommends, based on these reports, actions to be undertaken by the agents.
This principle states that centralization is always (weakly) preferred to decentralization. This
seems to be at odds with casual empirical observation. In most organizations, be they public
or private, players seem to recognize the benets of decentralization of decision making. It is
therefore a challenge for economists to understand rigorously the relative benets and costs
of decentralization.
An important aspect of the Revelation Principle is that it holds in environments in
which the players involved in the organization are committed not to renegotiate the initial
contract once their private information has been reported. A centralized organization is
based on an extensive communication network between the agents that allows the optimal
decision to be the result of a complete coordination of the available information. Such
centralized organization may not be feasible if agents can renegotiate the initial contract
following communication of their private information (see Holmstrom and Myerson (1983)
for a discussion of this basic point).
The approach taken in this paper is to suppose that organizations act as substitute
for incomplete markets because of the presence of asymmetric information. Within the
organization I assume the players cannot commit not to renegotiate past agreements every
time communication occurs. This assumption eectively invalidates the application of the
Revelation Principle. For example, a contract signed between two players in the presence of
asymmetric information may trade o between the eciency of the allocation and the costs
of providing the players with incentives for revealing their private information. This trade-
o generally involves incorporating in the contract some distortions (ex post ineciencies)
to elicit the players to reveal their private information. The problem is that, in general,
these distortions are time-inconsistent, that is, once the players have reported their private
information there is no reason to maintain allocative distortions. Thus, if players are not
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committed not to renegotiate the contract they will eectively renegotiate it. In this context,
the Revelation Principle generally does not hold.
These observations have lead economists to study \renegotiation-proof" contracts in en-
vironments where agents have commitment problems. There is a fairly abundant literature
on renegotiation now (for example, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990, Laont and Tirole, 1990,
Dewatripont, 1988 and 1989, Hart and Tirole, 1988, Beaudry and Poitevin, 1993 and 1994,
Maskin and Tirole, 1992, all study the eect of renegotiation on contracts with asymmetric
information). Renegotiation arises because agents have an opportunity to communicate after
the contract has been signed. Since renegotiation generally reduces their ex ante welfare,
players of the organization may seek ways to commit not to renegotiate. Organizational
design denes the communication channels that will govern the relationships between the
agents. It is therefore natural to think that an organization will be designed to prevent harm-
ful renegotiation. The organizational design then becomes a credible commitment towards
the prevention of renegotiation.
Consider the following simple example. Two players form an organization. Player 1 is
the principal and player 2, the agent. Suppose the two players sign a contract (setup the
organization) at date 0. At date 1, the agent receives some private information that is payo
relevant to the two players. For example, the agent may be the production manager who
learns about a new technology. The state of technology aects the agent's utility cost of
eort as well as the principal's monetary prot from production. Production occurs at date
2 after which payos for the two players are realized. It turns out that, even in this fairly
simple setting, organizational design can have a signicant impact on the eciency of the
organization.
Consider a centralized organization. In this case, the contract linking the two players
species that the agent must (veriably) report to the principal his private information (the
state of the technology) following date 1. The principal then orders a production level to
the agent and pays him the associated compensating wage as specied in the contract. The
contract is then a whole menu of production{wage pairs that are contingent on the agent's
report. The equilibrium contract is incentive compatible and induces the agent in revealing
his private information. Such a contract is associated with a centralized organization because
the principal centralizes information from the agent, and then gives production orders.
A centralized organization is quite vulnerable to renegotiation. The governance of a cen-
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tralized organization is based on a contract which requires the agent to send a veriable
message to the principal on which production and transfer payments depend. Communica-
tion, in the form of a veriable message sent by the agent, modies the set of alternatives
that the two players can renegotiate, that is, once the agent has sent his veriable message,
the contract species which production{wage pair should be chosen among all those spec-
ied in the menu of the contract. The two players then have a fairly precise idea of the
payo they will earn if they do not renegotiate the contract. Consequently, if renegotiation
occurs following the veriable message it may be quite easy for the two players to agree to
some new contract that improves on the chosen production{wage pair, and this even if such
renegotiation potentially arises under asymmetric information. In this case, renegotiation
may undo some of the incentives built in the contract, thus reducing the ex ante eciency
of the organization.
Consider now a decentralized organization. The contract governing a decentralized or-
ganization is a mapping from production levels to transfer payments. It requires the agent
to produce at a level of his choice, and his remuneration is then contingent on the cho-
sen production level as specied by the contracted mapping. No veriable communication
between the principal and the agent is necessary in a decentralized organization. The equi-
librium contracted mapping between production and wage is designed such that the agent's
production choice reveals his private information (the state of the technology). Such a con-
tract is associated with a decentralized organization because it eectively decentralizes the
production decision to the agent without any communication between the principal and the
agent.
A decentralized organization is not as vulnerable to renegotiation as is a centralized one.
Communication may still occur in a decentralized organization, but it is not veriable as
the contract species that the wage depends on the production level, not on the content of
communication between the two players. This dierence in the type of communication under
the two structures has a signicant impact on the success or failure of renegotiation. In a
decentralized organization, communication does not change the beliefs of the principal with
regards to the agent's private information, and more importantly it does not change the set
of alternatives that can occur if renegotiation is rejected. It is therefore almost impossible
for the two players to agree on a Pareto improving contract, and renegotiation cannot be
successful. Furthermore, renegotiation cannot succeed once the agent has produced since
then only the wage needs to be paid, and the players cannot agree on whether to reduce it
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or increase it. In a decentralized organization, renegotiation has very little eects on its ex
ante eciency and this type of organization therefore dominates a centralized organization.
The assumption that players cannot commit not to renegotiate ex post has important
consequences for our understanding of internal organizational design. If full commitment
is possible, the two types of organizations are equivalent in many cases (see Melumad and
Reichelstein, 1987, for a characterization of these cases); however, when full commitment is
not possible, organizational design may be an optimal response to commit not to renegotiate.
A decentralized organization limits the scope for ex post opportunism by limiting veriable
communication, and therefore is optimal ex ante. A centralized organization cannot achieve
such commitment, and is thus vulnerable to renegotiation. Ex ante players should choose a
decentralized organizational form.
The simple setting of one-sided private information leads to an interesting result linking
the eciency of an organization to the extent of decentralization it supports. This result,
however, may not be robust to the presence of bilateral private information. Suppose both
the principal and the agent possess some private information. For example, the principal may
have some information about demand, while the agent knows better the state of technology.
Optimal coordination requires that the production decision be based on the two players'
information. The organizational form must be setup to coordinate the private information
of the two players, while at the same time avoid costly (in terms of renegotiation) communi-
cation channels. There is a trade-o here between coordination and limited communication.
The optimal organizational design is then represented by a contract which achieves optimally
this trade-o.
With bilateral private information many dierent contracts are possible. A completely
centralized organization is governed by a contract that species a menu (matrix) of production{
wage pairs contingent on the veriable reports of the two players. After learning their private
information, both players report it, and the executed production{wage pair depends on these
reports. Such organization allows full communication, and hence maximal coordination of
the available information; however, it also allows for strong renegotiation possibilities since
full communication reduces the set of implementable alternatives if renegotiation is rejected.
It is then easy for the two players to agree to some Pareto improving contract.
A completely decentralized organization is governed by a contract that species a mapping
from production levels into wages. After learning his private information the agent decides
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on a production level based on the contracted mapping between output and wage. No
communication occurs in such an organization, and therefore coordination is minimal. The
agent makes his production decision based on his own information but not on that of the
principal. A completely decentralized organization eliminates communication, and hence
reduces the problem of renegotiation at the expense, however, of minimal coordination of
information. The eciency of the organization is then reduced because the production
decision is based on very limited information.
With one-sided private information, only these two types of organization exist, that
is, those with full communication (centralized) and those with no communication (decen-
tralized); however, with bilateral private information, there exist hybrid types with partial
communication. One player may communicate its information to the other player who then
makes the production decision based on this report and its own private information. I
call these hybrid organizations hierarchical organizations. They are governed by a contract
which species a menu of dierent mappings of production levels into wages where the spe-
cic choice of a mapping is contingent on one player's report of its private information.
For example, suppose the principal must report her private information to the agent who
then makes the production decision. The principal's report determines the choice of the
production{wage mapping that, in turn, conditions the agent's choice of production. Partial
communication occurs, namely, one player communicates its information. This leaves some
scope for renegotiation, but not as much as in a centralized organization since, following
one-way communication, the set of implementable alternatives is still fairly large (a whole
production{wage mapping). It may then be hard for the players to agree on what constitutes
a Pareto improving allocation. A hierarchical organization allows some coordination through
partial communication, but it also opens the door to some renegotiation which aects its ex
ante eciency.
With bilateral private information, three types of organization emerge. Centralized or-
ganizations are characterized by full communication and coordination of the information,
but also by a high potential for successful renegotiation. Decentralized organizations are
characterized by no communication and coordination of information, but also no potential
for renegotiation. Hierarchical organizations are in middle grounds: some coordination is
achieved at the expense of some renegotiation.
The rst objective of this paper is to characterize implemented allocations for all three
types of organization forms. The second objective is to compare these allocations to study
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the determinants of decentralization in an organization, and those of the ow of information
inside the organization.
There is a recent literature that studies the determinants of organizational form. Laont
and Martimort (1994) show how organizational form becomes a credible commitment against
collusion. In a model with two regulators they show that separation of powers between
these two regulators reduces their potential for discretionary behaviour. The separation
of powers limits the information each regulator can extract from the rm, which is shown
to limit collusive behaviour. This literature on collusion (see the citations in Laont and
Martimort) focuses on collusive behaviour to invalidate the Revelation Principle and to
explain decentralization. It shall be seen as complementary to this paper which focuses on
commitment problems.
The basic idea that organizational form can resolve commitment problems has been pro-
posed by Milgrom (1988) in a model of moral hazard. Milgrom shows that decentralization
of certain decisions to players that care about them may be an optimal response against
the presence of wasteful inuence activities. These activities reect the presence of ex post
opportunism, and therefore Milgrom's work is related to this paper.
Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein (1990, 1991) compare the relative eciency of
dierent hierarchical structures when communication costs are exogenously imposed. For
example, they show that decision-making should be decentralized to a better informed agent
if that agent cannot communicate all of his information to the principal. In this paper, I en-
dogenize or make precise what is the nature of these communication costs when commitment
is an organizational problem.
The next section describes the economic environment. Section 3 presents the analysis for
the one-sided private-information case. Section 4 provides a characterization of the imple-
mented allocations for the dierent organization forms in the bilateral private-information
case. Section 5 compares the dierent types of organizations. A conclusion follows.
2 The model
Two players form an organization to produce two actions a
1
and a
2
. Player i has control
over action a
i
. I denote by a = (a
1
; a
2
) the vector of action-pairs. I assume that a 2 A where
A is a compact set. The environment in which the organization evolves is stochastic. The
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variables 
1
and 
2
parameterize the uncertainty. Each realization of the variable 
i
is drawn
from a nite set 
i
=
n

L
i
; : : : ; 
H
i
o
. The probability of 
x
1
is 
x
> 0, and the probability of

y
2
is p
y
> 0.
Player 1, the principal, has state-contingent preferences over an action-pair a dened by
U(
1
; 
2
; a). The function U is monotonic, continuously dierentiable, and concave in a for
all 
1
and 
2
. Player 2, called the agent, has state-contingent preferences over an action-pair
a dened by V (
2
; a). The function V is monotonic, continuously dierentiable, and concave
in a for all 
2
. Note that the agent's preferences do not depend on 
1
. Even though this
facilitates the derivation of the results, it is also economically relevant in many dierent
circumstances. Finally, I assume that the principal and the agent have opposite preferences
over a
1
and a
2
, that is, signU
a
i
= sign V
a
i
for i = 1; 2. The principal and the agent have
reservation utility of u and v respectively. These assumptions assure that the contractual
problem is well behaved.
An allocation is a matrix of action-pairs where each entry is associated with a possible
realization of the states of nature. Denote an allocation by  = fa
xy
g
x;y=H
x;y=L
, where a
xy
is the
executed action-pair in states 
x
1
and 
y
2
.
Consider the following example. Suppose the agent is in charge of production, and
the principal is the residual claimant. The variable 
2
represents the productivity of the
technology used to produce the units of output, and 
1
, the level of demand. The action
a
2
represents the amount of units produced, while a
1
is a transfer from the principal to the
agent (the agent's wage). The agent's preferences are V (
2
; a) = v(a
1
)   e(a
2
; 
2
) where
e(a
2
; 
2
) represents the agent's personal cost of producing a
2
units with the technology 
2
.
The principal's preferences are U(
1
; 
2
; a) = P (
1
)a
2
  c(a
2
; 
2
)  a
1
where P (
1
) represents
the price at which the units are sold, and c(a
2
; 
2
), the nancial cost of producing a
2
units
with technology 
2
. With an appropriate choice of the functions v; e; P; and c, this example
would satisfy all above assumptions. Although this is a good example of the type of situations
I would like to model, I will still stick with the more general formulation.
The basic structure of the economic environment is the following. Before the states of
nature are revealed the two players get together and agree to some organizational form.
An organization is a commitment to some form of communication between the two players.
Once the organization is in place, nature chooses states 
1
and 
2
. Some communication
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occurs, thus inducing the execution of an action-pair a. Finally, payos are realized.
1
The organizational form is implemented by a contract that the two players sign before
the states of nature are realized. The form of the contract dictates the communication
channels through which players coordinate on an action-pair, and thus the allocation that is
implemented. This allocation depends on the type of contract that can be written and on
the process by which the contract is chosen and carried out. A contract has the following
general structure.
Denition 1 A contract c (or mechanism) is dened by
1. A menu of actions m(c) = fa
n
1
;n
2
g
N
1
;N
2
n
1
;n
2
=1
where a
n
1
;n
2
2 A for all n
1
; n
2
;
2. A communication structure through which the two players coordinate on an element of
the menu.
A contract is therefore a game form to be played by the two players. The game form
has some important features. First, it allows for mechanisms other than direct revelation
mechanisms since it is precisely the nature of the communication channels that is under
investigation here. Second, the coordination on a given action-pair is achieved through
the communication stage. The form of communication is derived endogenously and typically
depends on the informational environment as well as on the commitment possibilities. Third,
attention is restricted to contracts that only specify choices over deterministic outcomes.
Finally, I assume that the contract is enforceable.
The purpose of the paper is rst to characterize the constraints that renegotiation imposes
on implemented allocations and how dierent contractual arrangements can alter these con-
straints; and second, to characterize the contracts (or organizational forms) that will emerge
in dierent informational environments.
The approach is to rst construct a nite (renegotiation) game in which the players have
already signed a (status quo) contract. The players then observe their private information;
communicate; possibly renegotiate; and nally execute the agreed-upon action-pair. This
1
This framework is one of hidden information as the two players contract before the states of nature are
realized.
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game is used to derive conditions for an allocation to be robust to the possibility of renego-
tiation. Such allocations are supported by a status quo contract that is not renegotiated in
the renegotiation subgame.
2
The second step is to compare the welfare of the two players under dierent organizational
forms. For each organizational forms, there are typically many allocations that are robust to
renegotiation. I therefore focus on the (constrained) ecient allocation that maximizes the
ex ante expected utility of the principal subject to a participation constraint for the agent,
and to conditions for it to be renegotiation-proof. The comparison is then made on the basis
of these allocations.
3
Before proceeding with the analysis with private information, I will characterize the
optimal allocation under symmetric information. Suppose rst that the states of nature
become common knowledge and veriable after they are revealed. Consider the following
game.
1. The principal oers a contract c
0
.
2. The agent can accept or reject it. If he rejects it, the game ends, and both players
receive their reservation utility.
3. In the third stage (if reached), the players publicly observe the states 
1
and 
2
.
4. Both players choose their actions as prescribed by the element of the menu m(c
0
)
corresponding to the observed states.
This game has a simple structure and the communication channels are trivial. The contract
species a menu of action-pairs to be selected contingently on the realization of the states of
nature. The players publicly observe the realized states of nature, and simply execute the
action-pair from the contracted menu corresponding to the realized states.
2
This same approach has been used by Maskin and Tirole (1992).
3
One reason why the renegotiation game is not extended to include an initial contract proposal stage that
would endogenize the status quo contract is that an equilibrium renegotiation-proof allocation may fail to
exist in such a game; however, this nonexistence result is only caused by the fact that the game is nite. In a
nite game players can use the last stage of the game to commit to distortions which would be renegotiated
away had the game one more renegotiation stage. The last stage may then allow players to implement the
optimal full-commitment allocation. This approach is not satisfactory and is therefore discarded in favor of
the one above.
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For this game, the principal's strategy is to make a contract oer at the initial stage.
The agent's strategy is to accept or reject any oer the principal may make. Throughout
the paper, the equilibrium concept used is that of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as
dened in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
It is easy to show that any equilibrium allocation 
si
is a solution to the following maxi-
mization problem.
4
max
fa
xy
g
P
x

x
P
y
p
y
U(
x
1
; 
y
2
; a
xy
)
s.t.
P
x

x
P
y
p
y
V (
y
2
; a
xy
)  v
(1)
The equilibrium strategies are the following: the principal oers the contract c
si
with asso-
ciated menu m(c
si
) = 
si
; the agent accepts all contracts yielding an expected utility of at
least v.
The equilibrium allocation species an action-pair for each possible realization of 
1
and

2
. The contract helps players coordinate on an action-pair as well as providing them with
some risk sharing. The organizational form is quite simple in this framework. The states
of nature are veriable and no communication is necessary. The players simply execute the
action-pair corresponding to the realized states.
The equilibrium allocation is ex ante as well as ex post ecient. Ex post eciency arises
because the two players agree on which action-pair to execute following the realization of the
states of nature. There is therefore no room for successful renegotiation. Such unanimity
over which action-pair should be executed may be lost if the states of nature were privately
observed. In the next section we study the case in which 
1
is single-valued and the realization
of 
2
is observed privately by the agent. Section 4 looks at the bilateral private-information
case in which player i privately observes the realization of 
i
.
3 The one-sided private-information case
This section provides results for the one-sided private information case which carries some
intuition about the eect of renegotiation (or non-commitment) on optimal organization
design. Suppose that 
1
is single-valued and 
2
2 
2
.
4
Note that it is implicit in this formulation that the two players must stay in the organization following
the realization of the states of nature. This is a reasonable assumption when studying ongoing organizations.
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Organizational forms dier in the way players can communicate. Communication chan-
nels aect the incentives to reveal private information, and also the possibility for renego-
tiation at dierent stages. Two means of communication are considered. First, the players
can communicate verbally and veriably. The contract species that, once the agent has
observed 
2
, he must report to the principal his private information. This report is veri-
able and it conditions which element of the contracted menu is to be implemented by the
principal. Second, the agent can communicate physically. In this case the contract species
that the agent executes a specic action level a
2
among all those specied by the dierent
elements of the contracted menu. The principal then undertakes her own action a
1
based
on the action selected by the agent and the contracted menu. Although these two types of
communication appear quite similar in the way they coordinate the two players, they have
quite dierent implications for the possibility of renegotiation. With verbal and veriable
communication, there may be some scope for renegotiation after the agent's report; however,
with physical communication, the scope for renegotiation is greatly reduced given that the
action a
2
has already been executed.
I now present the characterization of the renegotiation-proof allocations under these al-
ternative communication structures when the two players cannot commit not to renegotiate;
however, before proceeding, I characterize equilibrium allocations when there is full commit-
ment. The two players then play the following commitment game.
1. The principal proposes a contract c
0
to the agent.
2. The agent accepts or rejects the contract oer. If it is rejected, the game ends and
both players receive their reservation utility.
3. In the third stage (if reached), the agent observes the state 
2
.
4. The agent selects an element s
0
2 m(c
0
).
5. Both players execute their action as prescribed by the element s
0
.
For this game, the principal's strategy is to oer a contract in stage 1. The agent's strategy
is to accept or reject the principal's contract oer, and to select an element of the contracted
menu contingently on the observed state of nature.
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Proposition 1 An allocation 
fc
1
is an equilibrium allocation of the commitment game if
and only if it is a solution to the following maximization problem.
max
fa
y
g
P
y
p
y
U(
1
; 
y
2
; a
y
)
s.t. (i)
P
y
p
y
V (
y
2
; a
y
)  v
(ii) V (
y
2
; a
y
)  V (
y
2
; a
y
0
) 8 y; y
0
(2)
The proof of this proposition is presented in Beaudry and Poitevin (forthcoming), and is
therefore omitted. The equilibrium allocation 
fc
1
yields the highest expected utility to
the principal subject to the agent's participation and incentive-compatibility constraints.
Incentive constraints ensure that the agent selects the appropriate element in the contracted
menu.
The allocation 
fc
1
is supported by the following strategies. The principal oers a contract
c
fc
1
with m

c
fc
1

= 
fc
1
. The agent accepts all contracts whose incentive-compatible menu
yields at least expected utility of v; he selects his most preferred element in the menu of the
accepted contract contingent on his private information 
2
.
The presence of incentive constraints generally introduces ex post distortions in the equi-
librium allocation. With full commitment, these distortions can be sustained in equilibrium
since no renegotiation is allowed; however, if the players cannot commit not to renegotiate,
they may try to use renegotiation to eliminate such distortions. Renegotiation can occur
at two instances. First, players can renegotiate after the agent has learned his private in-
formation, but before he selects an element of the menu. This is referred to as interim
renegotiation. Second, renegotiation can occur after the agent has selected an element of
the menu. This is ex post renegotiation. Beaudry and Poitevin (forthcoming) show that
interim renegotiation has no eect on the set of equilibrium allocations attainable under full
commitment.
5
I therefore do not consider this type of renegotiation and only focus on ex
post renegotiation.
Ex post renegotiation is introduced by allowing one renegotiation round after the agent
has communicated his private information to the principal. Consider the following renegoti-
ation game in which players start out with an arbitrary status quo contract c
0
.
6
1. The agent observes the state of nature 
2
.
5
This result is reminiscent of the \Groucho Marx" theorem proved in Milgrom and Stokey (1982).
6
In this game, only the principal is allowed to make renegotiation oers. This is meant as a simplifying
feature which has no bearing on the qualitative results.
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2. The agent selects an element s
0
2 m(c
0
).
2.1 The principal can oer a new contract c
1
to the agent.
2.2 The agent can then accept or reject this new oer.
2.3 If it is accepted, the agent selects an element s
1
2 m(c
1
).
3. Both players execute their action as prescribed by the element s of the outstanding
contract c.
For this game, a strategy for the principal consists in oering a renegotiation in stage 2.1 for
every element s
0
2 m(c
0
) that the agent may have selected. The agent must communicate
with the principal for every possible states of nature he might have observed by selecting an
element in the menu of the status quo contract c
0
; accept or reject the renegotiation oer
after any history so far; and if he accepts the renegotiation c
1
, he must communicate again
with the principal by selecting an element in the menu of the accepted contract c
1
.
The approach used here is to characterize those allocations that are supported by a status
quo contract which is not renegotiated along the equilibrium path even though it is possible
to do so. Allocations satisfying this property are called renegotiation-proof. I now dene
more formally renegotiation-proof allocations for the renegotiation game.
Denition 2 A renegotiation-proof allocation for the renegotiation game is an equilibrium
allocation of the renegotiation game which is supported by a status quo contract that is not
renegotiated in stage 2.1 along the equilibrium path.
The characterization of renegotiation-proof allocations depends on whether communi-
cation from the agent to the principal is verbal or physical. Suppose the organizational
form is such that all communication is verbal. The agent selects (veriably) an element of
the menu m(c
0
). This may communicate some information to the principal who may then
try to renegotiate the contract. The following proposition provides a characterization of
renegotiation-proof allocations when communication is verbal.
7
7
This proposition corresponds to Beaudry and Poitevin's (forthcoming) Proposition 5 and is therefore
stated without proof.
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Proposition 2 Suppose communication is verbal. An allocation is renegotiation-proof if and
only if it satises the following conditions.
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This proposition provides a characterization of renegotiation-proof allocations when com-
munication is verbal. These allocations must satisfy standard incentive-compatibility con-
straints and a set of constraints imposed by the requirement of renegotiation-proofness. The
conditions (ii) state that the equilibrium allocation must be such that, conditional on her
updated information following the agent's selection in the menu m(c
0
), the principal cannot
nd it protable to oer a new incentive-compatible contract to the agent. For example,
if the equilibrium allocation is separating, the set Y(a
y
0
) is a singleton, and therefore these
constraints impose ex post eciency.
Suppose now that communication is physical. The players then play the renegotiation
game described above. The only dierence with verbal communication is that the contract
species that the action a
1
taken by the principal depends on the action a
2
chosen by the
agent and the menu m(c
0
), and not on the agent's report. The agent therefore selects in
stage 2 an element in m(c
0
) by executing its associated action a
2
in the set of those specied
in the menu. This implies that the principal's renegotiation oer consists of a contract for
which every element of its associated menu includes the action a
2
chosen by the agent. This
eectively corresponds to the principal renegotiating only over action a
1
. The following
proposition characterizes the renegotiation-proof allocations.
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Proposition 3 Suppose communication is physical. An allocation is renegotiation-proof if
and only if it satises the following conditions.
(i) V (
y
2
; a
y
)  V (
y
2
; a
y
0
) 8 y; y
0
With physical communication, renegotiation-proofness does not impose any additional con-
straints on allocations beyond incentive-compatibility.
8
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
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We now compare the two means of communication. Many allocations may satisfy the
renegotiation-proofness criterion. The comparison is then established on the basis of the
renegotiation-proof allocations that maximize the ex ante expected utility of the principal
subject to a participation constraint for the agent that his expected utility is at least v. This
analysis yields the following results. First, the comparison of the constraints in problem (2)
and Proposition 2 indicates that, in general, verbal communication and renegotiation reduces
the set of attainable equilibriumallocations. For example, any separating renegotiation-proof
allocation must be ex post ecient while this may not be the case for a separating allocation
solving problem (2).
Second, the comparison of the constraints in problem (2) and Proposition 3 shows that
physical communication does not reduce the set of allocations attainable under full commit-
ment. Physical communication is a strong commitment to an action level which removes all
scope for renegotiation. Once the action a
2
is physically communicated to the principal (ex-
ecuted), she can only renegotiate over the action a
1
. Such renegotiation is never successful
since the two players have opposite preferences over this action.
In the one-sided private-information case, physical communication is preferred to verbal
communication since it eliminates all scope for renegotiating. This result can be given the
following interpretation. Verbal communication can be associated with a centralized orga-
nization where the principal collects all information, and then makes her decision based on
the reported information and the initial agreement the players have. Alternatively, physical
communication can be associated with a decentralized organization in which the principal
collects no information, and delegates decision-making to the informed agent. The result
then implies that decentralization of decision making is a credible means of avoiding the in-
eciencies associated with renegotiation in environments where players cannot commit not
to renegotiate. In one-sided private-information environments, a decentralized organization
is always preferred since only one player possesses private information. The organizational
form then serves the only purpose of avoiding renegotiation. This is optimally achieved
through decentralization.
With bilateral private information, the organizational form must not only limit the scope
for renegotiation, but also coordinate the actions on the information of the two players.
There is a trade-o between decentralization and centralization.
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4 The bilateral private-information case
In this section, I assume that 
1
2 
1
and 
2
2 
2
, where the probabilities of 
x
1
and 
y
2
are

x
> 0 and p
y
> 0 respectively.
As before, the organizational form denes the communication channels through which
the two players can coordinate. With bilateral private information, there are many possible
organizational forms. Three classes are considered. In the rst class, all communication is
verbal. The two players report their private information simultaneously. Based on these
reports, the contract prescribes an action-pair to be undertaken. In the second class, one
player rst communicates its information verbally, the second then communicates its infor-
mation physically, and nally the rst player executes its action based on the communicated
information. I will consider in turn the two cases in which the principal or the agent rst
communicates verbally. In the third class, the two players communicate their information
sequentially and physically. The two cases in which the principal or the agent communicates
rst are considered in turn.
9
Renegotiation can have very dierent eects on the set of equilibrium allocations depend-
ing on the type of communication allowed by the organizational form. Before proceeding
with the analysis, I will present the benchmark case in which there is complete verbal com-
munication and full commitment. The commitment game of the preceding section is slightly
modied to take into account bilateral private information.
1. The principal proposes a contract c
0
to the agent.
2. The agent accepts or rejects the contract oer. If it is rejected, the game ends and
both players receive their reservation utility.
3. In the third stage (if reached), the principal observes the state 
1
, and the agent
observes the state 
2
.
4. The principal selects a row r
0
2 m(c
0
), and the agent selects a column n
0
2 m(c
0
).
9
These three classes exhaust all interesting organizational forms. Or, players communicate simultaneously,
or they do it sequentially. In the latter case, the second stage of communication is always physical to avoid
renegotiation (see Section 3). The rst stage may be verbal or physical, corresponding respectively to the
second and third classes. In the former case, simultaneous communication must be verbal. It is easy to show
that simultaneous physical communication is (weakly) dominated by sequential physical communication.
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5. Both players execute their action as prescribed by the intersection of the row r
0
and
the column n
0
.
For this commitment game, the principal's strategy is to oer a contract in stage 1; and to
select a row of the menu of the accepted contract contingently on the state 
1
. The agent's
strategy is to accept or reject the principal's oer; and to select a column of the menu of the
accepted contract contingently on the state 
2
.
There are some dierences between the one-sided private-information case and the bilateral-
information case. First, in the latter, a menu is a matrix that associates an action-pair with
each possible combination of realizations of 
1
and 
2
. Therefore, by reporting its state of
nature a player selects a row (the principal) or a column (the agent) of the matrix. The
executed action-pair is that at the intersection of the selected row and column. Second, I
assume that the two players report their information simultaneously. It can be shown that
simultaneous reports (weakly) dominate sequential reports since, in the former case, each
player's incentive constraints only have to hold in expectation over the other player's types,
while in the latter case, for one player they have to hold for every type of the other player.
Proposition 4 An allocation 
fc
2
is an equilibrium allocation of the commitment game if it
is a solution to the following maximization problem.
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(3)
An equilibrium allocation 
fc
2
of the full-commitment game with bilateral private informa-
tion yields the highest expected utility to the principal subject to the agent's participation
constraint and the two players' incentive-compatibility constraints. Note that these con-
straints are in expected terms over the other player's state since both players communicate
simultaneously. The proof of this proposition is trivial and is therefore omitted.
10
10
The reason why an equilibrium allocation of the commitment game is not necessarily a solution to
problem (3) is that there may be multiple equilibrium reporting strategies for the two players at stage 4. For
example, truth-telling can be part of an equilibrium if the allocation is incentive compatible. Each player
tells the truth expecting the other to do so. However, lying may also be part of an equilibrium, that is, each
may have an incentive to lie if the other player is also expected to lie. This multiplicity can then be used to
support allocations that are not solution to problem (3).
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An allocation 
fc
2
is supported by the following strategies and beliefs. The principal
oers a contract c
fc
2
with m

c
fc
2

= 
fc
2
; and she selects her preferred row in the menu of
the accepted contract contingent on her private information 
1
, her prior beliefs about 
2
,
and her expectation that the agent reports truthfully. The agent accepts all contracts whose
associated incentive-compatible menu yields at least expected utility of v; and he selects
his most preferred column in the menu of the accepted contract contingent on his private
information 
2
, his prior beliefs about 
1
, and his expectation that the principal reports
truthfully.
As with one-sided private information, the presence of incentive-compatibility constraints
usually prevents the players from achieving optimal allocative eciency and risk sharing.
With full commitment not to renegotiate the contract, such distortions can be sustained in
equilibrium; however, if players cannot commit not to renegotiate, they have incentives to
eliminate such distortions once they learn their private information. Again renegotiation
can occur after the information has been learned, but before players communicate, or it can
occur after the players have communicated. Renegotiation after communication has occurred
is unlikely to have any eect on allocations as in the one-sided private-information case for
reasons cited therein. I therefore focus on renegotiation following communication.
The following subsections characterize the set of renegotiation-proof allocations for dif-
ferent communication structures or organizational forms. In each case, a renegotiation game
is dened. For a given renegotiation game ,, the following statement denes the set of
renegotiation-proof allocations.
Denition 3 A renegotiation-proof allocation for the , game is an equilibrium allocation of
the , game which is supported by a status quo contract that is not renegotiated in stage 2.1
along the equilibrium path.
This general denition is used throughout the analysis. Note that I delay the comparison of
the dierent organizational structures to Section 5.
4.1 Centralized organization
I rst examine the case in which the two players communicate simultaneously their informa-
tion verbally, and cannot commit not to renegotiate the initial contract. All information is
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centralized, and actions are dictated by the contract on the basis of the reported information.
Such organizational form can be associated with a centralized structure.
For any outstanding contract c
0
, the players play the following renegotiation game, re-
ferred to as the C game (for centralized communication).
1. The principal observes the state 
1
, and the agent observes the state 
2
.
2. The principal selects a row r
0
2 m(c
0
), and the agent selects a column n
0
2 m(c
0
).
2.1 The principal can oer a new contract c
1
to the agent.
2.2 The agent can then accept or reject this new oer.
2.3 If the contract c
1
is accepted, the agent selects a column n
1
2 m(c
1
).
3. Both players execute their action as prescribed by the intersection of the row r and n
of the outstanding contract c.
For the C game, the principal's strategy is to select a row of the menu of the status quo
contract contingently on the state 
1
; and to oer a new contract c
1
to the agent contingently
on the history of the game.
11
The agent's strategy is to select a column of the menu of the
status quo contract contingently on the state 
2
; to accept or reject the renegotiation oer
contingently on the history of the game; and to select a column in the menu of the contract
c
1
(if it has been accepted) contingently on the history of the game.
The following proposition provides a characterization of renegotiation-proof allocations
for the C game.
Proposition 5 An allocation is renegotiation-proof for the C game if and only if it satises
11
Note that, without loss of generality, the principal can be constrained to oer a contract c
1
whose menu
has only one row since the agent's preferences and the status quo outcome do not depend on 
1
.
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the following constraints.
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This proposition describes conditions that must be satised by any renegotiation-proof allo-
cation of the C game. Condition (i) represents the agent's incentive-compatibility constraints.
The set Y
n
a
xy
0
o
x

contains agent types for which the equilibrium allocation is a
xy
0
when
the principal's type is x. If the allocation is separating, this set reduces to a singleton.
The third condition then states that, given that the principal and the agent have reported
truthfully their private information, it is not possible for the principal to increase her ex-
pected utility (computed with her revised beliefs) by renegotiating to a surely acceptable
contract by the agent, that is, an incentive-compatible contract that increases the agent's
payo regardless of his beliefs about the principal's type. For example, if the allocation is
separating for a subset of types, condition (iii) implies that it must be ex post ecient in
those states. Condition (ii) requires that, given the expected renegotiation possibilities by
the principal after reports are in, she reports her type truthfully. The set of conditions (ii)
are more stringent than standard incentive-compatibility constraints because the prospect
of renegotiation may increase the desirability of reporting falsely.
12
The constraints in Proposition 5 are generally more stringent than those in the full-
commitment problem (3). Renegotiation allows the players to undo ex post some of the
distortions included ex ante to induce truth-telling. The principal's incentive constraints
then become more stringent since she accounts for the possibility of renegotiating when
12
Note that condition (ii) for x
0
= x implies condition (iii). The latter are included for expositional
purposes.
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evaluating dierent reports. The possibility of renegotiation therefore reduces the expected
utility of the principal compared with the full-commitment case.
Renegotiation has some eect because the organizational form species a contract that
remunerates the players according to the verbal (and veriable) report they make. The loss
in expected utility that the principal suers may be partially avoided by having one of the
players communicating verbally and the other physically. This is the object of the next
subsection.
4.2 Hierarchical organization
To avoid (at least partially) the adverse eects of renegotiation, the organizational form
can specify contracts that require one player to actually undertake its action as a means
of communicating with the other player. This is referred to as physical communication in
the sense that communication occurs by the very fact that one player is undertaking an
observable and veriable action. In this section, I consider the case in which one player
rst communicates verbally its information to the other player and then the other player,
on the basis of this report and its own information, undertakes its action. Finally, the rst
player undertakes its action. This organizational form is a mixed structure in that some
information is centralized through verbal communication, but not all information is. We
can associate this organizational form with a hierarchical structure. Such an organizational
form is vulnerable to renegotiation after the rst player verbally reports its information. No
action has yet been undertaken, and renegotiation can have some eect; however, once one
of the actions has been undertaken there is no room for further renegotiation.
There are two forms of hierarchical structure. First, the principal can communicate
verbally with the agent who then executes his action, followed by that of the principal.
Information is owing down the hierarchy, from the principal to the agent. Second, the
agent can communicate verbally with the principal, who then executes her action followed
by that of the agent. Information is owing up the hierarchy, from the agent to the principal.
I will consider these two cases in turn.
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4.2.1 Verbal communication by the principal
For any status quo contract c
0
, the players play the following renegotiation game referred to
as the HP game (for hierarchical communication initiated by the principal).
1. The principal observes the state 
1
, and the agent observes the state 
2
.
2. The principal selects a row r
0
2 m(c
0
).
2.1 The principal can oer a new contract c
1
to the agent.
2.2 The agent can then accept or reject this new oer.
3.1 The agent executes his action a
2
among all those available in the menu of the out-
standing contract.
3.2 The principal executes her action a
1
associated with the choice of a
2
and the menu of
the outstanding contract.
For the HP game, the principal's strategy is to select a row of the menu of the status quo
contract contingently on the state 
1
, and to oer a new contract c
1
to the agent contingently
on the history of the game. The agent's strategy is to accept or reject the renegotiation oer
contingently on the history of the game, and to execute an action a
2
in the menu of the
outstanding contract.
The HP game diers from the C game in that the agent can physically communicate
his information to the principal after she has communicated verbally. Renegotiation can
arise after the principal has verbally communicated. At this point the players have not yet
physically committed to one action-pair. Following the agent's physical communication, no
renegotiation can arise since only the principal's action can be changed.
Proposition 6 An allocation is renegotiation-proof for the HP game if and only if it satises
the following constraints.
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This set of conditions has to be satised for an allocation to be renegotiation-proof in the HP
game. The rst constraints are simply the agent's incentive-compatibility constraints. These
constraints are conditional on the principal's information. Since the agent communicates af-
ter the principal has communicated her information. The second constraints represent the
principal's incentive-compatibility constraints taking into account the possibility for renego-
tiation. The right-hand-side of the equation states that, from any allocation
n
a
x
0
y
o
y
, the
principal can always successfully renegotiate to another allocation f
y
g that is incentive
compatible for the agent (second set of constraints), and that is weakly preferred by the
agent regardless of his private information and beliefs (rst set of constraints). Any such
oer is surely acceptable by the agent since it increases his payos regardless of his beliefs.
Note that the renegotiated oer need not depend on 
1
since the agent executes his action a
2
before the principal can communicate, and his preferences are independent of 
1
. Conditions
(ii) then say that the principal must weakly prefer truthfully reporting her information to
misreporting and renegotiating to a surely-acceptable oer. The principal's incentive con-
straints hold in expected terms over the agent's information since the principal reports before
the agent communicates.
There are two dierences between the constraints in Proposition 6 and those in the
full-commitment problem (3). First, renegotiation constrains the expected utility that the
principal can achieve compared with the full-commitment case. The principal takes into
account the possibility of renegotiating before reporting, and this may aect the relative
value of dierent reports. Second, the sequentiality of communication implies that the
agent's incentive-compatibility constraints must hold contingently on the principal's private
information.
4.2.2 Verbal communication by the agent
I now consider the case in which the agent rst communicates verbally his information to
the principal, and then the principal physically communicates by executing her action.
Given a status quo contract c
0
, the players play the following renegotiation game referred
to as the HA game (for verbal by the agent).
1. The principal observes the state 
1
, and the agent observes the state 
2
.
2. The agent selects a column n
0
2 m(c
0
).
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2.1 The principal can oer a new contract c
1
to the agent.
2.2 The agent can then accept or reject this new oer.
3.1 The principal executes her action a
1
among all those available in the menu of the
outstanding contract.
3.2 The agent executes his action a
2
associated with the choice of a
1
and the menu of the
outstanding contract.
For the HA game, the principal's strategy is to oer a new contract c
1
to the agent con-
tingently on the state 
1
and the agent's choice of a column in the menu of the status quo
contract, and to execute the action a
1
prescribed by the menu of the appropriate outstanding
contract. The agent's strategy is to select a column in the menu of the initial contract contin-
gently on his private information, and to accept or reject the renegotiation oer contingently
on the history of the game.
Proposition 7 An allocation is renegotiation-proof for the HA game if and only if it satises
the following constraints.
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n
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y
2
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g
x
=
n
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0
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The conditions imposed by the communication scheme here are dierent from those in the
HP game because the two players move in reverse order and thus face dierent information
structure before playing. The rst conditions are the agent's usual incentive-compatibility
constraints which hold in expected terms over the principal's information given that the
agent reports before the principal communicates. The second conditions represent the prin-
cipal's incentive-compatibility constraints. The principal executes her action after the agent
has reported his information. The right-hand side of the inequality states that, from any
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allocation
n
a
xy
0
o
x
the principal can always successfully renegotiate to an allocation f
x
g
that is incentive compatible for the principal and weakly preferred by the agent regardless
of his private information and beliefs. Note that the renegotiated oer depends on 
1
as the
agent's perception of the status quo is contingent on it. It does not, however, depend on 
2
as
the principal will select a
1
before the agent can communicate again. The conditions (ii) then
say that, conditional on his revised beliefs about the agent's type, the principal must weakly
prefer to truthfully report her information and not renegotiate rather than renegotiate to a
surely-acceptable oer. The conditions (iii) represent standard incentive-compatibility con-
straints for the principal where the principal evaluates each action-pair using her revised
beliefs following the agent's report. In particular, if the allocation is separating for the agent
types, these constraints reduce to standard ex post incentive-compatibility constraints.
Again, a simple examination of the constraints in Proposition 7 and those of problem
(3) reveals that one-sided verbal communication can be harmful and thus can reduce the ex
ante expected utility of the principal compared to that in the full-commitment case.
4.3 Decentralized organization
Section 3 illustrates how physical communication becomes a means of avoiding ex post op-
portunism associated with renegotiation in the one-sided private-information case. I now
investigate whether an organizational form in which communication is only physical and
sequential can be helpful in reducing the losses associated with non-commitment and rene-
gotiation in the bilateral private-information case. Such organization is called decentralized.
It is most interesting to look at the case in which the two players take their action sequen-
tially. The rst player executes its action without any information from the other player.
The second player then undertakes its own action thus coordinating somewhat on the infor-
mation conveyed by the rst player's choice of action. Clearly, such structure dominates a
structure in which the two players would choose their respective action simultaneously, and
thus would have no opportunity to communicate with each other. A decentralized organiza-
tional form is not vulnerable to renegotiation since after the rst player has taken its action
and is committed to it, there is no room for renegotiating over the action of the second
player.
13
There are two possible organizational forms. First, the principal can communicate phys-
13
This is the same argument as that of Section 3.
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ically by executing her action, and the agent then undertakes his action. Information is
(physically) owing down the hierarchy, from the principal to the agent. Second, the agent
can communicate physically by executing his action, and the principal then undertakes her
action. Information is owing up the hierarchy, from the agent to the principal. I will
consider these two cases in turn.
4.3.1 Physical communication by the principal
Given a status quo contract c
0
, the players play the following renegotiation game referred to
as the DP game (decentralized communication initiated by the principal).
1. The principal observes the state 
1
, and the agent observes the state 
2
.
2. The principal executes her action a
1
associated with her preferred action-pair in the
menu m(c
0
).
3. The agent executes his action a
2
associated with the choice of a
1
and the menu m(c
0
).
For the DP game, the principal's strategy is to select an action a
1
contingently on the state

1
. The agent has no strategy since the contract is assumed to be enforceable, that is, the
agent has no choice but to execute the action a
2
associated with the action a
1
in the menu
of the outstanding contract.
The DP game diers from the previous games in that no verbal communication is re-
quired by the contract. The two players simply execute their respective action in turn. The
implemented allocation can only depend on the principal's information, and therefore the
menu of its associated contract only consists of a single column. The allocation must then be
incentive compatible for the principal in expected terms over the agent's type. Since rene-
gotiation cannot arise after the principal has physically communicated, the oered contract
will be renegotiation-proof. It is then clear that renegotiation-proof allocations satisfy the
following conditions.
(i)
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The avoidance of renegotiation through physical communication is achieved, however, at
the expense of lower coordination of the information of the two players. The equilibrium
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allocation can only depend on the principal's private information and not on that of the agent.
Note that the conditions for renegotiation-proofness do not conict with the constraints in
the full-commitment problem (3). Consequently, renegotiation-proof allocations are always
feasible in the full-commitment problem. In general, however, the lack of coordination has
some ex ante eciency costs as players can do better if they can commit not to renegotiate.
4.3.2 Physical communication by the agent
I now consider the case in which the agent communicates physically with the principal by
selecting his action rst.
Given a status quo contract c
0
, the players play the following renegotiation game referred
to as the DA game (for decentralized communication initiated by the agent).
1. The principal observes the state 
1
, and the agent observes the state 
2
.
2. The agent executes his action a
2
associated with his preferred action-pair in the menu
m(c
0
).
3. The principal executes his action a
1
associated with the choice of a
2
and the menu
m(c
0
).
For the DA game, the agent's strategy is to select an action a
2
contingently on his information

2
. For the same reasons as in the preceding section, the principal has no explicit strategy.
The implemented allocation can only depend on the agent's information since he selects
his action before the principal has any opportunity to communicate. The menu of the
contract consists of a single line, and must be incentive compatible for the agent in expected
terms over the principal's information. Again, renegotiation cannot arise after the agent has
physically communicated, and the oered contract is then renegotiation-proof. It is then
clear that renegotiation-proof allocations satisfy the following conditions.
(i)
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0
Note that these conditions are equivalent to standard ex post incentive constraints since the
allocation and the agent's preferences are independent of the principal's information. As
before, renegotiation is avoided at the expense of lower coordination of the information of
the two players, which has some ex ante eciency costs.
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The last two subsections characterize the decentralized organizational forms. A complete
decentralization avoids the adverse eects of renegotiation but coordinates poorly the dif-
ferent sources of information. With one-sided private information, such coordination is not
relevant, and decentralization is therefore the most preferred organizational form. With bi-
lateral private information, coordination of information may be important. The next section
compares the various organizational forms.
5 Comparisons of the dierent organizational forms
For each organizational form there may be many renegotiation-proof allocations. The com-
parison of these dierent organizational forms is then made on the basis of that renegotiation-
proof allocation which maximizes the ex ante expected utility of the principal subject to the
agent's participation constraint. For the , game, this maximizing allocation is dened as
follows.
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where RP (,) represents the set of renegotiation-proof allocations for the , game. Finally,
dene U
 
:=
P
x

x
P
y
p
y
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; 
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 
xy
).
Before comparing the dierent organizational forms, I shall mention that existence of
renegotiation-proof allocations is not a problem in well-behaved environments. In general,
the sets RP (,) are closed; they are nonempty in single-crossing environments. In these envi-
ronments, the agent's preferences satisfy the single-crossing property if V
a
1
=V
a
2
is monotone
in 
2
. The principal's preferences satises the single-crossing property if  U
a
1
=U
a
2
is mono-
tone in 
i
for each value of 
j
. Hence, for appropriate values of v there exists a solution to
(4) in these environments.
First, I study the extent of decentralization in organizations.
Consider the optimal allocation under complete decentralization to the agent (DA rene-
gotiation game) 
DA
. This allocation is independent of the principal's private information

1
. Consider now the hierarchical organization in which the principal rst communicates
verbally (HP renegotiation game). In that game, the principal can always refrain from
communicating any information about 
1
by oering a contract consisting of a menu with
identical rows. Her verbal communication is then uninformative to the agent, and the result-
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ing allocation is independent of 
1
. There are two cases. First, suppose that the allocation

DA
is renegotiation-proof under the HP organizational form. In this case, it may or may not
be optimal. Second, suppose that the allocation 
DA
is not renegotiation-proof under the
HP organizational form. It is then possible to show that an allocation 
HP
dominates 
DA
.
Therefore, decentralization to the agent is weakly dominated by the hierarchical organization
in which the principal communicates verbally.
A similar argument shows that the optimal allocation under complete decentralization to
the principal (DP renegotiation game) is weakly dominated by that of the hierarchical form
in which the agent rst communicates verbally (HA renegotiation game). We can therefore
state the following proposition.
Proposition 8 A decentralized organization is always weakly dominated by an appropriate
hierarchical organizational form.
The intuition behind this proposition is that if it is optimal for the principal to condition
the allocation on only one player's private information, then this may be achieved equally
well by a hierarchical organizational form as by a decentralized structure. If, to the contrary,
it is not optimal to do so, then a hierarchical organizational form performs strictly better
than a decentralized structure since it allows such conditioning on the two players' private
information.
This proposition shows that complete decentralization is generally not optimal in en-
vironments in which there is bilateral private information. Some coordination, even if it
induces costs associated with renegotiation, is optimal. This result shows that the solution
of the one-sided private-information case is not robust to the introduction of bilateral pri-
vate information. The trade-o between coordination and decentralization generally requires
some coordination. Verbal communication is then an essential ingredient of an optimal or-
ganization. Such communication and coordination can be achieved by a properly designed
organization in which communication channels allow information to be transmitted to the
decision maker. It then remains to compare the relative eciency of the dierent communi-
cation channels characterized in the previous section.
Suppose that there are only two types of principal and two types of agent, that is,

i
=
n

L
i
; 
H
i
o
for i = 1; 2. The case with one-sided private information can then be
parameterized by 
H
i
= 
L
i
for i = 1 or 2.
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When 
H
1
= 
L
1
, any communication by the principal becomes irrelevant. In this case, it
is easy to show that the following relationships hold.
U
C
= U
HA
 U
HP
In the renegotiation game HP, the (privately informed) agent communicates physically which
prevents any type of renegotiation. This is therefore the most preferred organizational form.
In the games C and HA, the agent communicates verbally, and thus there is scope for
renegotiation. These organizational forms are therefore inferior to the one in which the
agent communicates physically. Similarly, it is easy to show that the following relationships
hold when only the principal has some private information (
H
2
= 
L
2
).
U
C
= U
HP
 U
HA
These relationships bear the same interpretation as above.
The intuition learned in the one-sided private-information case should then hold when

H
i
is close to 
L
i
given the continuity in 
H
i
of the various maximization problems. This
intuition implies that, in a hierarchy, it is always better to have the player who has low
variance in its private information to send the verbal message. Information should then be
owing from the player who has the \least important" information to the other player to
minimize the costs associated with renegotiation. The optimal hierarchy is characterized
by some information communication, and then decentralization of decision making to the
player with the \most important" private information, where the information is important if
it inuences signicantly the action to be taken. For example, if 
H
i
is signicantly dierent
from 
L
i
, presumably that the optimal action-pair a is inuenced signicantly by the value
of 
i
.
Another conclusion that may be drawn from this exercise is that a centralized organization
is always dominated by an appropriate hierarchical organization when 
H
i
is close to 
L
i
for some i. A centralized organization should then arise when all dimensions of private
information are important to the eciency of the organization.
6 Conclusion
This paper oers a framework to study the trade-o between centralization and decentral-
ization. Typically, one associates with centralization a better coordination of all relevant
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information in decision-making. It is also generally thought that centralization bears some
costs. This paper makes precise what the costs and the benets of centralization are. The
costs of centralization come from the renegotiation of contracted allocation, while the benets
stem from the coordination of the decision on all available information.
An optimal organization must setup formal communication channels through which in-
formation ows to the decision-maker. These channels oer the opportunity to renegotiate
contracts, and such renegotiation has some ex ante eciency costs. Organizational form
then becomes a credible commitment to some communication channels that trade-o be-
tween coordination of information and its associated renegotiation costs.
Finally, this analysis suggests that it may be hard to derive a general approach to
asymmetric-information problems with non-commitment. In eect, the results of this paper
show that renegotiation-proof constraints depend on the details of the organizational form,
and are likely to grow in complexity as the dimensions of the private information (and/or
the size of the organization) increase. A \Renegotiation-Proof Revelation Principle" thus
appears unreachable. The Revelation Principle is possible in a world with commitment be-
cause all organizational forms require the common property of incentive-compatibility. Such
common property in renegotiation-proof environments has not been characterized yet. This
explains why this paper must proceed with a case-by-case analysis.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3 The necessity part of the proposition is trivial: all renegotiation-proof
allocations must be incentive-compatible.
The proof of the suciency part consists in constructing strategies and beliefs that sup-
port any incentive-compatible allocation as an equilibrium allocation that is not renegotiated
along the equilibrium path of the renegotiation game. Consider the following strategies and
beliefs.
Stage 2: The agent of type y selects his preferred action-pair in the menu a
y
2 m(c
0
), and
execute the associated action a
y
2
.
Stage 2.1: Regardless of her beliefs, the principal makes no contract oer. At this stage,
her beliefs are simply the Bayesian revision of her prior concentrated on the set Y

a
y
0

,
where a
y
0
is the selected pair by the agent.
Stage 2.2: The agent of type y accepts all contract oers which are weakly preferred to the
allocation a
y
0
, and rejects all other oers.
Stage 2.3: The agent of type y selects his preferred allocation in the menu m(c
1
).
It is clear that these strategies and beliefs form a PBE of the renegotiation game. In stage
2, the agent anticipates no renegotiation, and therefore he chooses his favored element in
the menu of the outstanding contract by executing its associated action a
2
. In state 2.1,
the principal can do no better than not making any oer, since she knows that the agent
accepts only those contracts that are weakly worse o for her. Finally, in stages 2.2 and 2.3,
the agent accepts all contracts that he weakly prefers to the status quo, and then selects his
preferred element in the menu of the outstanding contract. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5 The rst part of the proof shows that conditions (i){(iii) must be
satised by any renegotiation-proof allocation for the C game.
Conditions (i) are standard incentive-compatibility constraints for the agent which must
naturally be satised by any renegotiation-proof allocation.
Consider now the conditions (iii). Suppose one is not satised for a value of x and y
0
in a
renegotiation-proof allocation. Renegotiation-proofness implies that, along the equilibrium
path, following the reports x (the principal) and y
0
(the agent), the action-pair a
xy
0
must be
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executed without being renegotiated. Consider the principal's beliefs following the reports.
The principal must (Bayesian) revise her prior in the set Y
n
a
xy
0
o
x

. Since the action-
pair a
xy
0
does not satisfy condition (iii), there must exist a vector of incentive-compatible
action-pairs f
y
g for y 2 Y
n
a
xy
0
o
x

such that
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. Suppose that, in stage 2.1, the principal
oers to the agent a contract c
1
with m(c
1
) = f
y
g for y 2 Y
n
a
xy
0
o
x

. By construction, the
agent should accept this contract regardless of his beliefs regarding the principal's type since
rejection would implement the action-pair a
xy
0
which is strictly worse than an appropriately
chosen element of f
y
g. Acceptance of c
1
by the agent eectively induces the principal in
oering this contract, thus upsetting the equilibrium. Conditions (iii) must then be satised
by a renegotiation-proof allocation.
Consider now the conditions (ii). Suppose that one is not satised for a value of x and x
0
in a
renegotiation-proof allocation, and that the principal of type x reports x
0
. The interior of the
bracket on the right-hand-side of the inequality of condition (ii) represents the maximum
the principal of type x can get by reporting x
0
when the agent reports y
0
. The principal
can achieve it by renegotiating to an allocation that will surely be accepted by the agent
regardless of his beliefs. (This is easily shown by the same argument as above.) Summing
these terms over y
0
gives the expected utility the principal gets by reporting x
0
before she
knows what the agent will report. If the condition (ii) is not satised, the principal has an
incentive to report x
0
, and then renegotiate to an allocation that will surely be accepted by
the agent. Hence, any renegotiation-proof allocation must satisfy the conditions (ii).
The next step in the proposition is to construct strategies and beliefs for the C game
that support any allocation satisfying conditions (i){(iii) as a renegotiation-proof allocation.
Consider the following strategies and beliefs.
Stage 2: The principal of type x reports truthfully. The agent of type y reports truthfully.
Each player reports truthfully by choosing the row or column that it prefers in the
menu m(c
0
).
Stage 2.1: Regardless of the reports made in stage 2, the principal makes no contract oer.
At this stage, her beliefs are simply the Bayesian revision of her prior concentrated on
the set Y
n
a
xy
0
o
x

.
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Stage 2.2: Following the reports x
0
and y
0
, the agent of type y accepts all contract oers
which are weakly preferred to the allocation a
x
0
y
0
, and rejects all other oers.
Stage 2.3: The agent of type y selects his preferred allocation in the menu m(c
1
).
It is clear that these strategies and beliefs constitute a PBE of the C game. If the contract
c
1
is accepted, the agent selects his preferred element in its associated menu. Given this
selection strategy, it is rational for the agent to accept those contracts that he weakly prefers
to the status quo action-pair a
x
0
y
0
. Given this acceptance strategy, the principal can do no
better than make no oer since the status quo allocation satises conditions (iii). Finally,
given the ensuing resolution of the game and given that the status quo allocation satises
conditions (i) and (ii), it is optimal for the two players to report truthfully. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6 The rst part of the proof shows that conditions (i){(ii) must be
satised by any renegotiation-proof allocation for the HP game.
Conditions (i) are standard incentive-compatibility constraints for the agent which reect
the sequentiality of decisions in the game. These constraints must naturally be satised by
any renegotiation-proof allocation.
Consider now the conditions (ii). Suppose one is not satised for a value of x and x
0
in a
renegotiation-proof allocation. Renegotiation-proofness implies that, along the equilibrium
path, upon reporting x (the principal), every executed action-pair in the vector fa
xy
g
y
is
not renegotiated. Since condition (ii) is not satised for x and x
0
, there exists an incentive-
compatible vector of action-pairs f
y
g
y
such that
P
y
p
y
U(
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1
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y
2
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y
) >
P
y
p
y
U(
x
1
; 
y
2
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xy
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and V (
y
2
; 
y
) > V (
y
2
; a
x
0
y
) for all y. Suppose that the principal reports x
0
in the stage 2,
and oers in stage 2.1 a contract c^ with m(c^) = f
y
g
y
which is accepted in stage 2.2 by the
agent. Since c^ is incentive compatible, the agent selects his preferred element in the menu
m(c^) at stage 3.1. In stage 2.2, it is then a dominant strategy for the agent to accept the
contract c^ if oered by the principal because, by construction, this contract yields a strictly
better allocation for the agent regardless of his beliefs about the principal's type. In stage
2.1, the principal then oers the contract c^, which is preferred to the status quo contract,
given that she has reported x
0
in stage 2. In stage 2, the principal then has an incentive to
report x
0
and renegotiate since, by construction, this yields her a strictly higher expected
utility than reporting x. Hence, all conditions (ii) must be satised by a renegotiation-proof
allocation for the HP game.
The next step in the proposition is to construct strategies and beliefs for the HP game
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that support any allocation satisfying conditions (i){(ii) as a renegotiation-proof allocation.
Consider the following strategies and beliefs.
Stage 2: Conditional on her type, the principal selects her preferred row in the menum(c
0
).
Stage 2.1: Regardless of her type, the principal makes no contract oer.
Stage 2.2 Conditional on his type y and the principal's report x, the agent accepts all
contract oers that are weakly preferred to a
xy
and rejects all other oers.
Stage 3.1: The agent selects his preferred action-pair in the menu of the outstanding con-
tract, and execute the associated action a
2
.
It is clear that, if an allocation satises the conditions (i){(ii), these strategies and beliefs
form a PBE of the HP game. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7 The rst part of the proof shows that conditions (i){(ii) must be
satised by any renegotiation-proof allocation for the HA game.
Condition (i) represent the agent's incentive-compatibility constraints in expected terms over
the principal's type since the agent selects a column of the menu before the principal has
any chance of communicating her information to the agent. It is clear that these constraints
must be satised by any renegotiation-proof allocation for the HA game.
Consider now conditions (ii). Suppose one is not satised for a value of x and x
0
in a
renegotiation-proof allocation. Renegotiation-proofness implies that, along the equilibrium
path, following the agent's report y
0
, every executed action-pair in the vector
n
a
xy
0
o
x
is
not renegotiated. In stage 2.1, the principal Bayesian updates her prior over the support
Y
n
a
xy
0
o
x

. Since condition (ii) is not satised for x and y
0
, there exists a vector of action-
pairs f
x
g
x
such that
X
y2Y
(f
a
xy
0
g
x
)
p
y
U(
x
1
; 
y
2
; 
x
) >
X
y2Y
(f
a
xy
0
g
x
)
p
y
U(
x
1
; 
y
2
; a
xy
);
and V (
y
2
; 
x
) > V (
y
2
; a
xy
0
) for all x and y 2 Y
n
a
xy
0
o
x

. Furthermore, this vector is
incentive compatible for the principal conditional on her revised beliefs, that is,
X
y2Y
(f
a
xy
0
g
x
)
p
y
U(
z
1
; 
y
2
; 
z
) >
X
y2Y
(f
a
xy
0
g
x
)
p
y
U(
z
1
; 
y
2
; 
z
0
)
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for all z; z
0
. Suppose that the principal oers a contract c^ with m(c^) = f
x
g
x
in stage 2.1,
and that the agent accepts it in stage 2.2. Since this contract is incentive compatible, the
principal selects her preferred element in the menu m(c^) in stage 3.1. By construction, this
new contract strictly dominates the outstanding contract for the agent, and he must then
accept it regardless of his beliefs at stage 2.2. Given this resolution of the game following
the oer c^, the principal indeed oers the contract c^, which is preferred to the status quo
contract given that she has reported x at stage 2. Hence, all conditions (ii) must be satised
by a renegotiation-proof allocation for the HA game.
I now consider the conditions (iii). These constraints state that, conditional on the principal's
Bayesian updating of her prior following the agent's report, the principal has an incentive to
report truthfully at stage 3.1. These constraints must be satised by any renegotiation-proof
allocation.
The next step in the proposition is to construct strategies and beliefs for the HA game
that support any allocation satisfying constraints (i){(iii) as a renegotiation-proof allocation.
Consider the following strategies and beliefs.
Stage 2: Conditional on his type, the agent selects his preferred column in the menum(c
0
).
Stage 2.1: Regardless of her own type and the agent's selection, the principal makes no
contract oer.
Stage 2.2 Conditional on his type y and his report y
0
, the agent accepts all contract oers
that are weakly preferred to
n
a
xy
0
o
x
for all x, and rejects all other oers.
Stage 3.1: The principal selects her preferred action-pair in the column of the outstanding
contract and execute the associated action a
1
.
It is clear that, if an allocation satises the constraints (i){(iii), these strategies and beliefs
form a PBE of the HA game. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8 We rst show that the allocation 
DA
is weakly dominated by the
allocation 
HP
of the HP game. Since 
DA
is independent of 
1
, the conditions (i) for
renegotiation-proofness are equivalent to conditions (i) in Proposition 6. Suppose rst that

DA
satises conditions (ii) of Proposition 6. It would then be renegotiation-proof for the HP
game, and the result would be proven. Now, suppose that 
DA
does not satisfy conditions (ii)
of Proposition 6. This implies that at least one type of principal can increase its expected
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utility without decreasing that of the agent (and without violating the agent's incentive
constraints). For each principal type, compute the solution to the maximization problem of
the right-hand-side of constraints (ii) in Proposition 6 with a
x
0
y
= 
DA
y
. Since the constraints
of that maximization are independent of 
1
, these solutions themselves satisfy the principal's
incentive compatibility constraints (ii) in Proposition 6. Furthermore, they satisfy the agent's
incentive-compatibility constraints. This means that these solutions are renegotiation-proof
for the HP game. Since this allocation is strictly better than 
DA
, the result is proven.
A similar argument shows that the allocation 
DP
of the DP game is weakly dominated
by the allocation 
HA
of the HA game. Q.E.D.
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